On Human Nature and the Need for Ethical Education: Part II

Abstract

Our innate characteristics are oft demarcated as Human Nature and since antiquity efforts to isolate and comprehend them have deliberated whether they are naturally fixated or a product of culture and education. But is it worth our efforts to understand Human Nature? Indeed it is through these deliberations that we partially express our individuality and character. And indeed, our present age has made such an understanding become progressively significant as a multitude of arguments are presented using Human Nature as a means to circumvent ethical responsibility—one often hears, `but violence and warfare is inescapable and certain, it is Human Nature,’ or `he couldn’t help not cheat on her, it`s men’s nature to be so’ or `one cannot blame bankers for we would have done the same if opportunity presented itself, Human nature is greedy.’

Hence, immoral behavior is made to be cogent but rarely on a metaphysical or even organic basis. A dogma heavily indebted to commercial consumption furthers spin—carried on all media, it bears a daily sermon reminding us that we are we are belligerent and egotistical. To retort such discourses, an unblemished understanding of human nature is desirable. Without doubt, consciousness, contemplation and choice are fundamental to one’s character and are arguably the underpinning to morality. As Human nature is frequently placed in a dualistic scenario, merely put as good or bad, the two dissimilar perspectives may be weighed.

Hitherto, we dealt with the Confucian sage, Mengzi (孟子) or Mencius, and specifically his justification on the assertion that Human nature is good. This position is diametrically opposed to another Confucian philosopher, Xunzi (荀子), on his assertion that Human nature is bad.  As formerly discussed, Mengzi held that human being have intuitive predispositions that can be cultivated towards righteousness, often associating these inclinations to sprouts or buds—which partake in a natural path of evolution. Whence nurtured by the elements, that is, if nursed in a setting beyond mere subsistence, with the endowment of moral instruction, and given our individual determination to advance our virtues, we can raise our buds to strength. Xunzi, argued that Mengzi mistook nature for what was conscious practice. Xunzi differed for he alleged humans are born with a weakness towards self-profit, an abhorrence and aversion towards others, a proneness to suspicion and hate, and cravings for crude pleasure. To Xunzi, pursuing our natures would be to engross ourselves into unrelenting and vicious mutual conflict, disorder and corruption. To this end Xunzi summed his outlook on Human Nature.

Rather fortuitously, humans correspondingly have the aptitude for reason and the capability to reflect on where our natural outlooks and cravings carry us. Xunzi contends that by our acumen, humanity could amendment the inherent foul propensities and their route to chaos into a subsistence of magnificence and harmony. Xunzi debated that in antiquity, the most far-sighted and astute, the sages, grasped that acting in accordance to one’s nature was the inevitable path towards ruin. Hence, the thinkers fashioned philosophies of righteousness and evil to restrain the uninhibited quest of satiating our own selfish yearnings and to necessitate attention towards others. Hereafter, the masters thus shaped customs, practices, or conducts, which Xunzi ascribed as `rituals,’ that guide us to admire virtues in others and to be indebted for their offerings. Xunzi demonstrates the importance of ritual by way of a simple communal drinking ceremony where all congregated but one cup sufficed from which each drank on the order of seniority. The order taught the youth to give way to the elder (hierarchy and order), whilst the one cup taught unity and harmony.

`Mengzi states that man’s nature is good, but I say that this view is wrong. All men in the world, past and present, agree in defining goodness as that which is upright, reasonable, and orderly and evil as that which is prejudiced, irresponsible, and chaotic. This is the distinction between good and evil. Now suppose that man’s nature was in fact intrinsically upright, reasonable and orderly – then what need would there be for philosopher kings and ritual principles? The existence of philosopher kings and ritual principles could certainly add nothing to the situation. But because man’s nature is in fact evil, this is not so. Therefore, in ancient times the sages, realizing that man’s nature is evil, that is prejudiced and not upright, irresponsible and lacking in order, for this reason established the authority of the leader to control it, elucidated ritual principles to transform it, set up laws and standards to correct it, and meted out strict punishments to restrain it…

If the nature of man were good, we could dispense with sages and forget about ritual principles. But if it is evil, then we must go along with the sages and honor ritual principles. The straightening board is made because of the warped wood; the plumb line is set up because things are crooked; leaders are set up and ritual principles elucidated because the nature of man is evil. ` ⁽¹⁾

But in this certainty of the transforming power of practices there lies a conundrum for Xunzi. If one begins with such maliciousness, how can we develop goodness? Xunzi retorts that there exist particular innate compulsions which are reinforced when we express them via our conduct. He notes that all creation endears members of its kind. Birds too lament over the loss of their companions and elephants stay beside their kin for days without movement. Hence as to sages, they too lack an assured and inherent ethical superiority.  Xunzi retells that philosopher kings like `Yu` were cut from the same stone as thieves and robbers—at birth their natures were one and alike and betterment is thus assuredly within our aspirations.

`The man in the street can become a Yu. What does this mean? What made the philosopher emperor Yu a Yu, I would reply, was the fact that he practiced benevolence and righteousness and abided by the proper rules and standards. If this is so, then benevolence, righteousness, and proper standards must be based upon principles which can be known and practiced. Any man in the street [can become a Yu]. ` ⁽²⁾

Given the suspicious assessment of human nature above, it is expected that the Xunzi provides a means of amending self-seeking desires but his allegory for the path, or dao, to goodness is unlike Mengzi’s sprouts. Xunzi understood human beings to be craftsmen, who manner themselves into something refined, like a potter with cumbersome clay who shapes, by his art or `ritual’, a bowl to precision—the vessel could never have come naturally (i.e. without acquired skill/ ritual). Hence, like the potter’s stand, the sages have conveyed the implements for shaping ourselves.

 

`Learning proceeds until death and only then does it stop… Its purpose cannot be given up for even a moment. To pursue it is to be human, to give it up to be a beast. ` ⁽³⁾

 

Hence, along with all the wicked incentives that get us into misfortune, we have innate compulsions which bind us as one, which can be braced by conduct. Humanity maybe convoluted and at variance with its inspirations and impetuses—perhaps then Xunzi is veracious in asserting that we must mold ourselves to confine that which provokes us to immorality and reinforce that which goads us towards harmony.

 

`In the same way a man, no matter how fine his nature or how keen his mind, must seek a worthy teacher to study under and good companions to associate with…. Then, although he is not aware of it, he will day by day progress in the practice of benevolence and righteousness, for the environment he is subjected to will cause him to progress. But if a man associates with men who are not good, then he will hear only deceit and lies and will see only conduct that is marked by wantonness, evil, and greed. Then, although he is not aware of it, he himself will soon be in danger of sever punishment, for the environment he is subject to will cause him to be in danger. An old text says, ‘If you do not know a man, look at his friends; if you do not know a ruler, look at his attendants.’ Environment is the important thing! Environment is the important thing!`  ⁽⁴⁾

1. Watson, Basic Writings,2003, 162, 163-164
2. Xunzi,translated by Watson, 170
3. Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (2001), p. 258
4. Watson, Basic Writings,2003, 170-171.

 

On Human Nature and Ethical Education: Part I

Our innate characteristics are oft demarcated as Human Nature and since antiquity efforts to isolate and comprehend them have deliberated whether they are naturally fixated or a product of culture and education. But is it worth our efforts to understand Human Nature? Indeed it is through these deliberations that we partially express our individuality and character. And indeed, our present age has made such an understanding become progressively significant as a multitude of arguments are presented using Human Nature as a means to circumvent ethical responsibility—one often hears, `but violence and warfare is inescapable and certain, it is Human Nature,’ or `he couldn’t help not cheat on her, it`s men’s nature to be so’ or `one cannot blame bankers for we would have done the same if opportunity presented itself for Human nature is greedy.’

Hence, immoral behavior is made to be cogent but rarely on a metaphysical or even organic basis. A dogma heavily indebted to commercial consumption furthers spin—carried on all media, it bears a daily sermon reminding us that we are we are belligerent and egotistical. To retort such discourses, an unblemished understanding of human nature is desirable. Without doubt, consciousness, contemplation and choice are fundamental to one’s character and are arguably the underpinning to morality. As Human nature is frequently placed in a dualistic scenario, merely put as good or bad, the two dissimilar perspectives may be weighed.

One may begin with the Confucian sage, Mengzi (孟子) or Mencius, and specifically his justification on the assertion that Human nature is good. Mengzi ardently defended an outlook for a virtuous lifecycle for humanity, often summarized as the path or Dao, which emphasized merits likes benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom as fundamental. This path initiates from birth towards adulthood, social interaction, and parentage to births anew. Hence, to Mengzi people have innate capacities or predispositions towards such merits and so logically wish to align to them. To Mengzi, these merits are inborn and not bonded externally. Mengzi utilizes a rural allegory, labelling these predispositions as seedlings or buds of virtue located in our emotional-mindset which Mengzi identifies as the base of our rational and emotional temperaments. If one wholly nurtures these buds by henceforth inclining towards one’s natural predispositions towards virtue, to Mengzi, one shall raise ones human nature to bear fruit and humanity shall then flourish.

 

The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right or wrong is the beginning of wisdom.
Men have these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs. Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that they cannot develop them is to destroy themselves.

(Mengzi 2A:6)

What proof suffices Mengzi`s view on human nature and its innate capacities and merits? He offers a most famed hypothetical experiment (Mengzi 2:A6), `the child and the well.’ A child wanders unconsciously towards a well. Mengzi contends, any observer would have an instantaneous and innately natural reaction with a gush of fear and compassion. Undeniably, merely even visualizing the child imprisoned in the well`s depths may reason this alarm. Mengzi concludes that one’s instantaneous and innately natural response to the endangerment stalking the child demonstrate that we have a natural predisposition towards goodwill and hence merely inclined to react by such fear and sympathy when sighting that, in this circumstance, the vulnerable and innocent are in harm’s way. To Mengzi, this exposes the bud of compassion in human nature.

The sense of mercy is found in all men; the sense of shame is found in all men; the sense of respect is found in all men; the sense of right and wrong is found in all men.

(Mengzi 6A:6)

To be precise, to Mengzi it exposes the bud but an effusively settled virtue of compassion is yet absent, it is a maiden variety perhaps that can be refined towards ripeness. Nonetheless, one might still propose altered explanations of the observers’ reactions—the response may be instrumentally motivated, that is, the fear and compassion is backed by certain ends or ulterior aims. Perhaps the child`s guardians will concede to a favor in return—possibly monetary. Mengzi discards this interpretation stating the surge of compassion will cast itself not because or rather in spite of a desire to debt the said guardians, to attain recognition or even mere selfish annoyance of the sound of the child`s constant cries. What is indispensable, states Mengzi, is that the response of fear and compassion is impulsive and non-reflective—it is uncalculated and thus innate.

Shouldn’t it be that cruelty, larceny, and egocentricity are rare? If Human Nature is good, ought immorality to be rare? But immorality isn’t rare. Mengzi counters that unscrupulous conduct is not due to an immoral nature. Mengzi, copiously mindful of the existence of the corrupt, articulates the following:

As for [people’s] qing [essence], “what they genuinely are,” they can become good. This is what I mean by calling their natures good. As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault of their potential. Humans all have the heart of compassion. Humans all have the heart of disdain. Humans all have the heart of respect. Humans all have the heart of approval and disapproval. The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to us externally. We inherently have them. It is simply that we do not concentrate upon them. Hence, it is said, “Seek it and you will get it. Abandon it and you will lose it”

(Mengzi 6A:6)

Replies: Moral Attitudes and Individualism

Replies to Comments:

Surely, you can see that there has been an improvement in our moral attitudes. There has been much talk around moral attitudes and progress has been made regarding them.  Many matters, once refrained from discussion, considered taboos and what not are such no longer. The brave Feminist movement has brought many matters up to discussion to state one example.  

 

I am not of the outlook that is an indication of the enhancement of our moral approaches. I find the feminist movement generally embracing a reasonably vague or indecisive view regarding for instance, the spread of pornography, or use of coarse lyrics and the like which have come to be more mainstream.  I think this decay is something to be astonished with and I would not sing of it as progress.

One could argue that bringing attention to matters previously overlooked may convey awareness but most frequently it is used as an instrument to rub-off one’s credentials and sound agreeable to the public whilst ravaging on about the transgressions of others, which has at all times been a fairly spiteful profession but has little to do with virtuous conduct by itself. To belittle others to make one seem majestic is rather ludicrous and added exhibition of the yearning to appear good than really be good.  If its intent lies only in gaining leads against professed adversaries by pushing them into humiliating corners, it is but common trickery under an altered cloak.  If under the exceptional context of enlightening personal conduct, then it is advancement, but one can scarcely see these copious mock trials on media as having any real semblance towards that aim.

Furthermore, any metric for measurement of moral evolution appears mysterious to me—perhaps if one observes matters deteriorate utterly over the passage of time as an outcome, one can. In an open society, notwithstanding personal outlooks, individuals have an implicit concern for the good and morality aims to be the vehicle for this good, which follows from an agreed basis of morality, as I addressed in my previous writing.  A more curious paradox is that whilst we cannot agree on what delineates “good”, we all seem to know it instinctively when we experience it.

People have had for a substantial amount of periods a code of upright conduct which they espoused and studied. The mostly-lost and unsaid code of courtship, which hemmed in life-long matrimony made bonds between a husband and wife possibly much more polite in many ways—certainly not naïvely idyllic for I desist from faith in utopias.

 

Replies to Comments:

Also, the individualism you mentioned, if put in historical terms is actually a very recent phenomenon if you consider the expanse of human history. So regarding your comment, we are only learning to cope with this freedom. As you mentioned earlier, we are not flawless. This is a part of the proletariat reaching their revolutionary consciousness. Your outlook is unnecessarily bleak.

 

Personal-sovereignty and freedom are not one and the same—you are referring to a strong desire for the former. All accurately freely-exercised liberties come at the expense of the liberties of another. In line with what is answered above and the allusion to the [civilized] expanse of human history, one could contend that there were some ethical prepositions which until somewhat recently people agreed upon and abided by which are now abandoned for the lure of persona-sovereignty whose consequences are self-evident. Those better endowed with social means (affluence) and authority prosper, those lacking are left to suffer. Likewise, a collapse in moral mandate has historically continuously been followed by an anarchical condition allowing for the State (and its monopoly on the use of force) to fulfill the role as the arbiter of social behavior.

Evidently, a vast bulk of social changes have not been obtained through neither widespread demand nor dialogue and are fueled by specialist groups or persons, who have often substantial resources at their disposal and who seek to advance certain notions and give them the thrust that they otherwise would not have mustered.

Lastly, my interpretations are perfectly constructive if there are gifted persons who would make out that blunders have been committed. One collective facet of those who commit mistakes is their habitual denial of their occurrence. One is reminded of Confucius: “A man who has committed a mistake and doesn’t correct it is committing another mistake.”