Our innate characteristics are oft demarcated as Human Nature and since antiquity efforts to isolate and comprehend them have deliberated whether they are naturally fixated or a product of culture and education. But is it worth our efforts to understand Human Nature? Indeed it is through these deliberations that we partially express our individuality and character. And indeed, our present age has made such an understanding become progressively significant as a multitude of arguments are presented using Human Nature as a means to circumvent ethical responsibility—one often hears, `but violence and warfare is inescapable and certain, it is Human Nature,’ or `he couldn’t help not cheat on her, it`s men’s nature to be so’ or `one cannot blame bankers for we would have done the same if opportunity presented itself for Human nature is greedy.’
Hence, immoral behavior is made to be cogent but rarely on a metaphysical or even organic basis. A dogma heavily indebted to commercial consumption furthers spin—carried on all media, it bears a daily sermon reminding us that we are we are belligerent and egotistical. To retort such discourses, an unblemished understanding of human nature is desirable. Without doubt, consciousness, contemplation and choice are fundamental to one’s character and are arguably the underpinning to morality. As Human nature is frequently placed in a dualistic scenario, merely put as good or bad, the two dissimilar perspectives may be weighed.
One may begin with the Confucian sage, Mengzi (孟子) or Mencius, and specifically his justification on the assertion that Human nature is good. Mengzi ardently defended an outlook for a virtuous lifecycle for humanity, often summarized as the path or Dao, which emphasized merits likes benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom as fundamental. This path initiates from birth towards adulthood, social interaction, and parentage to births anew. Hence, to Mengzi people have innate capacities or predispositions towards such merits and so logically wish to align to them. To Mengzi, these merits are inborn and not bonded externally. Mengzi utilizes a rural allegory, labelling these predispositions as seedlings or buds of virtue located in our emotional-mindset which Mengzi identifies as the base of our rational and emotional temperaments. If one wholly nurtures these buds by henceforth inclining towards one’s natural predispositions towards virtue, to Mengzi, one shall raise ones human nature to bear fruit and humanity shall then flourish.
The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of deference and compliance is the beginning of propriety; and the feeling of right or wrong is the beginning of wisdom.
Men have these Four Beginnings just as they have their four limbs. Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that they cannot develop them is to destroy themselves.
(Mengzi 2A:6)
What proof suffices Mengzi`s view on human nature and its innate capacities and merits? He offers a most famed hypothetical experiment (Mengzi 2:A6), `the child and the well.’ A child wanders unconsciously towards a well. Mengzi contends, any observer would have an instantaneous and innately natural reaction with a gush of fear and compassion. Undeniably, merely even visualizing the child imprisoned in the well`s depths may reason this alarm. Mengzi concludes that one’s instantaneous and innately natural response to the endangerment stalking the child demonstrate that we have a natural predisposition towards goodwill and hence merely inclined to react by such fear and sympathy when sighting that, in this circumstance, the vulnerable and innocent are in harm’s way. To Mengzi, this exposes the bud of compassion in human nature.
The sense of mercy is found in all men; the sense of shame is found in all men; the sense of respect is found in all men; the sense of right and wrong is found in all men.
(Mengzi 6A:6)
To be precise, to Mengzi it exposes the bud but an effusively settled virtue of compassion is yet absent, it is a maiden variety perhaps that can be refined towards ripeness. Nonetheless, one might still propose altered explanations of the observers’ reactions—the response may be instrumentally motivated, that is, the fear and compassion is backed by certain ends or ulterior aims. Perhaps the child`s guardians will concede to a favor in return—possibly monetary. Mengzi discards this interpretation stating the surge of compassion will cast itself not because or rather in spite of a desire to debt the said guardians, to attain recognition or even mere selfish annoyance of the sound of the child`s constant cries. What is indispensable, states Mengzi, is that the response of fear and compassion is impulsive and non-reflective—it is uncalculated and thus innate.
Shouldn’t it be that cruelty, larceny, and egocentricity are rare? If Human Nature is good, ought immorality to be rare? But immorality isn’t rare. Mengzi counters that unscrupulous conduct is not due to an immoral nature. Mengzi, copiously mindful of the existence of the corrupt, articulates the following:
As for [people’s] qing [essence], “what they genuinely are,” they can become good. This is what I mean by calling their natures good. As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault of their potential. Humans all have the heart of compassion. Humans all have the heart of disdain. Humans all have the heart of respect. Humans all have the heart of approval and disapproval. The heart of compassion is benevolence. The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to us externally. We inherently have them. It is simply that we do not concentrate upon them. Hence, it is said, “Seek it and you will get it. Abandon it and you will lose it”
(Mengzi 6A:6)
Henceforth, to Mengzi it is not that only the praiseworthy have this essence, the bud of virtue, but that the praiseworthy are those who merely never misplace it. This misplacement or corruption of human nature is thus the stunting of the bud. He offers another allegory (Mengzi 6:A8), `the parable of Ox Mountain.’ This peak is by nature lush and forested. Nonetheless, if sheep graze at liberty at its foliage and axes reduce its woods, it is to no astonishment if it becomes desolate. Likewise, if attains maturity in a disordered milieu, mistreated by conceited parents, overindulgences, unrestricted with excessive liberty, it is to no astonishment if one’s own moral nature correspondingly misplaces its ability to bloom. In one sense, enlightening virtues do not institute a marring or fundamental alteration of one’s nature, as Mengzi further articulates, nurturing compassion and virtue is unlike carving a tree into cups and bowls, but is its cultivation to bloom—ethical education is not type of mutilation or limitation but, akin to cautious gardening, it institutes a nurturing that permits inborn predispositions to reach fulfilment. Education should thus arouse the inherent capacities of the human mind.
He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature
(Mengzi 7:A1)
This viewpoint places Mengzi at odds with Confucians such as Xunzi who held people were inherently wicked but that is the theme of a future text.
Sayyed's Remuniations 